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Abstract 
 
The informality discourse is large, vibrant and expanding fast. But there is a certain 
conceptual incoherence to the literature. New definitions of informality compete with old 
definitions leading to a plethora of alternative conceptualisations. While some individual 
studies may apply a tight definition consistently, the literature as a whole is in a mess. This 
paper proposes that informality and formality should be seen in direct relation to economic 
activity in the presence of specified regulation(s). Relative to the regulation(s), four 
conceptual categories that can help frame the analysis are: (A) regulation applicable and 
compliant, (B) regulation applicable and non-compliant, (C) regulation non-applicable after 
adjustment of activity and (D) regulation non-applicable to the activity. Rather than use the 
generic labels informal/formal, it would be preferable if the analysis focused on these four 
categories (or even more disaggregated as appropriate). A central determining factor in the 
impacts of regulation on economic activity across these four categories is the nature and 
intensity of enforcement. While lack of enforcement is well documented, understanding of 
its determinants—why and to what extent a government would not enforce a regulation that 
is has itself passed, and why non-enforcement varies from one context to another, is 
relatively neglected in the literature. Thus specificity on regulation and on enforcement is 
the key to achieving conceptual clarity in the analytical literature and in the policy 
discourse on informality. 
                                                 
* Cornell University: T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and 
Management, and Professor of Economics. This paper is based on my V.V. Giri Memorial Lecture, delivered 
at Lucknow on 13 December, 2008, to the Golden Jubilee Conference of the Indian Society of Labour 
Economics. This lecture draws on joint work with Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis and Elinor Ostrom on 
Informality, and with Arnab Basu and Nancy Chau on Enforcement. I thank them without implicating them in 
the conclusions I reach in this paper. 
1. Introduction  
 
Informality is a term that has the dubious distinction of combining maximum policy 
importance and political salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in the 
analytical literature. There is a plethora of definitions, which leads to incoherence in 
analysis and, at its worst, major policy failures. This paper begins, in Section 2, by 
establishing this claim. This is followed in Section 3 by an attempt at putting forward a 
coherent and tightly defined framework for identifying situations that might merit the label 
“informality.” The proposal is to define informality and formality to relate closely to state 
intervention and regulation, and indeed to specific interventions. Thus in this approach 
context is central, so the key is for each study to define carefully which regulation it has in 
mind, and what it means by informality relative to this regulation. Generic and general 
definitions, which abound in the literature, are inimical to sound analysis and policy advice. 
Section 4 takes up a neglected aspect of informality which cannot be ignored once the 
specific framework proposed here is adopted—the enforcement of regulations. It is argued 
that that conceptual and empirical analysis of enforcement is an integral part of any 
analysis of informality, that it is crucial to any policy proposals on intervention and 
regulation, but that this is a relatively neglected topic in the literature. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Informality in the Literature 
 
The informality literature is of course vast. There is a multitude of 
conceptualisations and definitions.1 Here is how Keith Hart, who is recognised to have 
introduced the term into the literature more than three decades ago (Hart, 1973), saw 
informality in a recent review (Hart, 2006, p.25): 
 
“The main message of the paper (Hart 1973) was that Accra’s poor were not 
‘unemployed’. They worked, often casually, for erratic and generally low returns; but they 
were definitely working.…Following Weber, I argued that the ability to stabilise economic 
activity within a bureaucratic form made returns more calculable and regular for the 
workers as well as their bosses. That stability was in turn guaranteed by the state’s laws, 
which only extended so far into the depths of Ghana’s economy. ‘Formal’ incomes came 
from regulated economic activities and ‘informal’ incomes, both legal and illegal, lay 
beyond the scope of regulation. I did not identify the informal economy with a place or a 
class or even whole persons. Everyone in Accra, but especially the inhabitants of the slum 
where I lived, tried to combine the two sources of income. Informal opportunities ranged 
from market gardening and brewing through every kind of trade to gambling, theft and 
political corruption.” 
 
Thus the multifaceted nature of informality was “present at the creation”, the term 
attempting to capture a number of features of what Hart observed in Accra. But perhaps the 
central tenet, also present at the start, is captured in the statement that “‘Formal’ incomes 
                                                 
1 This argument is advanced in Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006). This section draws on the 
introduction to that volume. 
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came from regulated economic activities and ‘informal’ incomes, both legal and illegal, lay 
beyond the scope of regulation.” 
 
 Hart’s term was taken up rapidly by development studies and by international 
agencies, by the ILO (1972) in particular, which began to codify the definition of 
informality, particularly keeping in mind the needs of national statistical authorities in 
measuring the extent and nature of informality. Two decades on from Hart’s original 
contribution, ILO (1993, paragraph 5) provided the following definition: 
 
 “They [informal enterprises] are private unincorporated enterprises (excluding 
quasi-corporations), i.e. enterprises owned by individuals or households that are not 
constituted as separate legal entities independently of their owners, and for which no 
complete accounts are available that would permit a financial separation of the production 
activities of the enterprise from the other activities of its owner(s). Private unincorporated 
enterprises include unincorporated enterprises owned and operated by individual household 
members or by several members of the same household, as well as unincorporated 
partnerships and co-operatives formed by members of different households, if they lack 
complete sets of accounts.” 
 
This enterprise based definition of informality relates to those enterprises that fall outside 
the purview of laws establishing incorporated enterprises. But they cover a large variety of 
types of enterprises, and in any event the requirements of incorporation differ across 
countries which are often based on size of enterprise. Even within a country, statistical 
systems are not consistent in their definitions. Thus Narayana (2006, p. 93) concludes for 
India that: 
 
 “….in general, differences in concepts and definitions are more than similarities 
and, hence, the available databases are not comparable for measurement of economic 
contributions and performance between the formal and informal enterprises.” 
 
 The broader literature in the mean time evolved and proliferated definitions of 
informality. As far back as a quarter of a century ago, barely a decade after Hart (1973), 
Lipton (1984, pp. 198-201) presented a review of the literature which identified the 
following characteristics of the “informal sector”: 
 
 “….(1) substantial overlap between providers of capital and providers of labour in 
each enterprise’; (2) ‘prevalence of perfect, or rather ... near-perfect, competition’; and (3) 
‘IS consists largely of “unorganised,” unincorporated enterprises, to which legal 
restrictions on employment (wage minima, regulations affecting working conditions, etc.) 
and on acquisitions of non-labour inputs (licences, quotas, etc.) do not apply ....” 
In addition to this, many writers evoked smallness of size as a separate feature of informal 
enterprises. 
 
 Further to the above variations, a strand of the literature before and after Hart 
identifies informality with “instability”, “lack of organisation”, “disorganised.”  Elements 
of this characterisation are present in the literature well before Hart. Geertz’s (1963) 
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contrast between the suq or bazzar on the one hand and “rational enterprise” in the sense of 
Weber matched similar characterisations even earlier by Lewis (1954) and Boeke (1943). 
The formal sector is supposed to have, as in Hart’s characterisation above, a degree of rule 
based stability. It is argued by Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006), that this 
dichotomy has been at the root of major policy failures such as the nationalisation of forests 
in South Asia, supposedly done to curb deforestation caused by “informal” forestry 
management. As Ostrom (1990) and Nagendra and Ostrom (2007) have shown, not only 
was this characterisation wrong, nationalisation led to even greater deforestation through 
organised corruption. de Soto (2003) for extending the rule of law to the informal sector, 
although more carefully and prudently made, nevertheless seem to draw from the same 
strand, or sentiment, in the literature. From a different perspective, Scott (2008), using the 
metaphor of language, has discussed how “vernaculars” come to be dominated by 
“universals”, to the detriment of the former.  
 
 Most recently, there have been arguments to extend the definition of the informal 
sector to include not only certain types of enterprises but also certain types of workers as 
well. To quote Chen (2006, p76), the object is to: 
 
 “…extend the focus to include not only enterprises that are not legally regulated but 
also employment relationships that are not legally regulated or protected. In brief, the new 
definition of the ‘informal economy’ focuses on the nature of employment in addition to 
the characteristics of enterprises. 
 
This new move in defining informality finds its official expression in the recent report of 
India’s National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCFEUS), which 
uses two definitions, one for the informal sector and one for informal workers (NCFEUS, 
2008, p2): 
 
 “The informal sector consists of all unincorporated private enterprises owned by 
individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services 
operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten total 
workers….Informal workers consist of those working in the informal sector or households, 
excluding regular workers with social security benefits by the employers, and the workers 
in the formal sector without any employment and social security benefits provided by the 
employers". 
 
 From all of the above, I think it would be fair to say that although individual studies 
apply tight definitions and consistently, the literature as a whole is a mess of alternative 
conceptualisations and different measures. Sindzingre (2006, p. 61) summarises a recent 
review as follows: 
 
 “The definitional criteria display logical inconsistencies in terms of hierarchy and 
exclusiveness. The informal economy is defined via the criterion of a form, that is, a 
negative form (not being ‘formal’), which coexists, however, with a series of ‘substantive’ 
criteria that refer to categories and characteristics of firms with variable and non exclusive 
attributes (e.g., being small firms, urban, unregistered, and so on).” 
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No wonder, then, that Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006, pp. 2-3) conclude that: 
 
 “Given the prominence of the formal–informal dichotomy in the development 
discourse, one might expect to see a clear definition of the concepts, consistently applied 
across the whole range of theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis. We find no such 
thing. Instead, it turns out that formal and informal are better thought of as metaphors that 
conjure up a mental picture of whatever the user has in mind at that time.” 
This lack of coherence seems to me to lead to analytical and policy problems. Analytically, 
information can be used inconsistently across different conceptualisations all of which are 
linked only by the use of the common term “informality.” Policy analysis can also be 
affected, since very disparate situations are all given the same label, of “informality”, with 
a related tendency to apply the same policy instrument to very different situations. 
 
It is perhaps too late to abandon the terms “informal” and “formal”, which have 
become embedded in the discourse. Rather, I think the answer is for each study to set out 
precisely what its definition of informality is, and for differences in definitions to be 
appreciated when analytical or policy results are being derived. The next section develops a 
framework for such precision. 
 
3. Intervention and Informality 
 
In attempting to put forward a coherent approach to informality, I want to draw on 
what I think is indeed a common strand in the literature, namely that the distinction 
between informality and formality is to do with the relationship of economic activity to 
intervention or regulation by the state. But I want to go further and say that every 
characterisation of formality and informality needs to specify precisely the regulation 
concerned. Formality and informality are dichotomies relative only to specific 
interventions or regulations. This has two immediate implications. First, definitions based 
on other criteria, such as size, or capital intensity, or degree of organisation, or nature of 
competition, etc., cannot be used (unless of course the criterion itself appears in the 
regulation). Second, generic definitions of informality are not be used, or at least are to be 
treated with careful scrutiny as to their usefulness in analytical and policy discourse. 
 
However, even this tight specification leaves a fair amount of complexity. Imagine 
a world without intervention and then the introduction of the intervention or regulation. To 
fix ideas, think of this as being a minimum wage regulation for enterprises above a certain 
size in a particular sector. Economic agents have to decide simultaneously whether to 
comply and how to adjust to this intervention. This creates several possibilities for agents 
and their activities post-intervention, relative to the pre-intervention situation: 
 
A. Stay within the ambit of the regulation and comply. 
 
B. Stay within the ambit of the regulation but not comply. 
 
C. Adjust activity to move out of the ambit of the regulation. 
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D. Outside the ambit of the regulation in the first place, so no need to adjust. 
 
If we had to use the labels “formal” and “informal”, category A would perhaps merit 
the label “formal”. If the rest of the categories are “informal”, then B is clearly “informal-
illegal.” What about categories C and D? For both of these categories, the regulation does 
not apply--for example, because the regulation stipulates minimum enterprise size, and 
these enterprises are below that minimum size. But there is clearly a difference between 
them—category C has adjusted size to come below the minimum size, while category D 
was below the minimum size in any case so the regulation has not affected it at all. Should 
either, neither, or both, of these be labeled “informal”? To pose the question is to reveal the 
problem that a single label in this case will obscure more than it reveals. A, B, C and D are 
distinct categories with specific economic features in relation to the regulation under 
consideration. It is best to keep them separate unless a compelling case can be made that 
aggregation is analytically revealing and provides for better policy analysis. 
 
Of course the above exercise can be done for a set of regulations—for example for 
minimum wage laws, social security provision, health and safety regulations, etc., across a 
broad range of sectors. As the set of regulations expands, then perhaps the size of category 
D shrinks as fewer and fewer activities stay outside the intended ambit of the regulations as 
a group. Indeed, the size of category D is sometimes taken as a measure of the extent of 
“the problem” if the regulation is taken to be “good”, since this is the group of agents who 
are not covered by regulation. But again, generality and genericness is problematic. I would 
argue that it is better to consider the issue regulation by regulation, and conduct a detailed 
analysis of the impacts of each, since these may be very different within the categories 
A,B, C and D, and even more so in relation to movements of activity between these 
categories. 
 
None of the above is to gainsay the argument that it is useful to have broad numbers 
on the general characteristics of an economy. For this, generating numbers of workers who 
are or are not covered by a broad set of regulations might be useful. But then one has to be 
careful that these numbers are comparable across countries and over time, which means 
specifying the regulations in the set, and further clarifying whether two regulations with the 
same label, in two different countries or at two points in time, are in fact the same. Or, 
indeed, even if the labels do mean the same thing, the extent to which even the same formal 
regulation is enforced differently in different situations. This leads me to a discussion of 
what I consider to be a relatively neglected topic in the conceptualisation of informality. 
 
4. The Central Role of Enforcement 
 
The economic agent faces a decision which takes into account the costs and benefits 
of (i) staying or not staying within the ambit of the regulation and (ii) if staying, then 
complying or not complying with the regulation. But it should be noted that the sequence 
runs from (ii) to (i). The way to think about this is that conditional on staying the agent 
decides whether it is better or not to comply, and then, given this conditional decision, 
whether it is better to stay or leave the ambit of the regulation. Thus, for example, if 
enforcement were perfect then the category B would be empty and the only choice would 
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be between category A and C. But with less than perfect enforcement and compliance all 
three categories A, B and C are affected. The intensity of enforcement affects decisions 
which permeate through the different categories—in particular, how many and which sorts 
of activities will be found in each category. Thus understanding enforcement is central to 
understanding the nature and character of formality and informality. 
 
That the enforcement of regulations in developing countries is less than perfect is 
well established. Taking the case of labor regulations, for example, there is a large 
literature that shows significant violations the world over. For minimum wage legislation, 
for example, non-compliance is found in Brazil (Lemos, 2004), Costa Rica (Gindling and 
Terrell, 1995), Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2006) and Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse, 
2004). For Mexico Levy (2007, p 88) argues that: 
 
 “….illegal salaried labor is substantial: 36.5 percent of total nonpublic salaried 
labor. In other words, in the absence of evasion, [social security] coverage would be at least 
58 percent higher than it is today!” 
 
For India, non-enforcement of labor regulations is well known. Here is how Papola, Mehta 
and Abraham (2008, p 12) summarise two studies for India: 
 
 “…in Gujarat, Unni(2000) found that out of the 53 branches of employment listed 
for fixation of minimum wages by the Gujarat Government in the informal sector….a 
majority of workers, especially women, earned less than they were entitled to. Patel (1990) 
in a study of sacked mill workers who have found employment mostly in the informal 
sector earned what was below the level of the statutory minimum wage.” 
 
There are many reports of this type for India. For example, Madheswaran, Rajasekhar and 
Gayathri Devi (2005) document non-enforcement for beedi workers in Karnataka. For 
Maharashtra, Sundar (2008) also documents non-enforcement of a raft of labour 
regulations.  For India as a whole, Papola, Pais and Sahu (2008) show widespread 
prevalence of wages below official minimum wages. 
 
The nature of labour inspection is described by Papola, Mehta and Abraham (2008, p. 13) 
as follows: 
 
 “The inspectors are reported to meet their quota of inspection by inspecting along 
easily accessible locations. Quite often they fill the forms themselves sitting in the office. 
Employers on such cases have a field day in infringing the law by paying less than the 
minimum wages fixed for their workers. This is evident from the statistics on actual wages 
vis-a-vis the statutorily fixed minimum wages, as reported in several studies.” 
 
Thus there is widespread lack of enforcement of regulations. But this raises three 
important questions. First, this lack of enforcement is not uniform over time and across 
space—what accounts for the variations? Second, why should a government pass a 
regulation which it then does not enforce? Third, how exactly should we take into account 
non-enforcement in discussing the pros and cons of new (or even old) regulations, since 
 7
non-enforcement will create illegality and therefore informality? These, I would argue, are 
still open questions in the literature, after more than three decades of debate and discourse 
on informality. 
 
These three questions all point to one thing—we need a conceptualisation of 
enforcement and the enforcement process. We need a theory of why governments enforce 
to differing extents. We then need to embed this theory into the evaluation of regulations. 
Only then will we have a complete picture of informality and its determinants. Such theory, 
such conceptualisation, is relatively speaking neglected in labor economics. It certainly 
seems to be neglected in Indian labour economics literature, where the focus has been 
much more on documenting non-enforcement rather than following through on its 
implications. There is a theoretical literature that can help us get started. For example, the 
early work of Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) and later work of Yaniv (2001) both address 
the issue of the government’s enforcement decision when enforcement is costly. Basu, 
Chau and Kanbur (forthcoming) consider optimal government choice of the minimum age 
and enforcement intensity as a joint decision in the two policy instruments, and furthermore 
pay special attention to the issue of the credibility of enforcement. It is all very well for the 
government to claim it is going to enforce, and even have sufficient inspectors to enforce, 
but if the inspectors “turn a blind eye” and are known to turn a blind eye, the government’s 
claim will ring hollow (especially if the inspectors are following the government’s own 
implicit rather than explicit, lead. The theoretical concerns modeled in Basu, Chau and 
Kanbur (forthcoming) are present in the policy context in India in the report of the Second 
National Labour Commission (Government of India, 2002, paragraph 12.250): 
 
“In West Bengal, when we enquired why the minimum wage law was not being 
enforced, we were told that both the Trade Unions and the Government Department had 
agreed to the below-minimum wage payments as both were agreed on protecting the jobs 
of beedi workers. We have enough reasons to believe that similar arrangements are entered 
into elsewhere too by the enforcing authorities and the representatives of workers. We 
believe that any law that creates such a situation becomes a mockery, if not a self-inflicted 
fraud. We, therefore, feel that we should legislate only what is capable of being put into 
practice at the ground level. Anything higher that is desirable will have to remain an 
aspiration or an eventual goal, not a clause in the law. Any other course will breed 
disrespect, unconcern and contempt for the law and law enforcing authorities.” 
 
So how can the government convince the market that it is serious about 
enforcement, if it wants to do so? The theoretical results in Basu, Chau and Kanbur 
(forthcoming) argue that one way of doing this is to have a high official minimum wage. If 
the government’s “loss function” depends on the gap between the official wage and the 
actual wages ruling in the market, by legislating a higher minimum wage it can signal 
credibly its intention to enforce more and thus narrow this gap. This is in fact an argument 
put forward by ground level activists like the Self Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) for why they lobby for higher official wages even in the face of non-
enforcement—because with a bigger gap between official and actual wages, they can then 
lobby for more enforcement effort, with a resulting higher actual wage. The theory of Basu, 
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Chau and Kanbur (forthcoming) captures this ground level strategy of activists working for 
the poor. 
 
The key conceptual point is that the optimal level of the minimum wage cannot be 
seen in isolation from its enforcement; the two are jointly determined and in turn determine 
who complies, who does not, and who moves out of the ambit of the regulation—in other 
words, categories A, B and C. Further, attempts to extend the regulation to category D will 
create new members of categories A, B and C—the precise nature of this allocation will 
depend on the precise nature of the enforcement problem. This applies of course to any 
regulation and the allocations it creates across these categories. The conceptualising of 
informality is thus intimately connected to the conceptualising of enforcement. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The informality discourse is large, vibrant and expanding fast. But there is a certain 
conceptual incoherence to the literature. New definitions of informality compete with old 
definitions leading to a plethora of alternative conceptualisations. While some individual 
studies may apply a tight definition consistently, the literature as a whole is in a mess. This 
paper proposes that informality and formality should be seen in direct relation to economic 
activity in the presence of specified regulation(s). Relative to the regulation(s), four 
conceptual categories that can help frame the analysis are: (A) regulation applicable and 
compliant, (B) regulation applicable and non-compliant, (C) regulation non-applicable after 
adjustment of activity and (D) regulation non-applicable to the activity. Rather than use the 
generic labels informal/formal, it would be preferable if the analysis focused on these four 
categories (or even more disaggregated as appropriate). A central determining factor in the 
impacts of regulation on economic activity across these four categories is the nature and 
intensity of enforcement. While lack of enforcement is well documented, understanding of 
its determinants—why and to what extent a government would not enforce a regulation that 
is has itself passed, and why non-enforcement varies from one context to another, is 
relatively neglected in the literature. Thus specificity on regulation and on enforcement is 
the key to achieving conceptual clarity in the analytical literature and in the policy 
discourse on informality. 
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